The Supreme Court has recently handed down two judgments with important consequences for residenziale landlords and managing agents, as set out below.
Aviva Investors Ground Rent GP Ltd and another -v- Williams and others [2023] UKSC 6
This case involved flats in Southsea, which formed part of a mixed-use commercial and residential block. The Leaseholders initially applied to the First Tier Tribunal to determine whether the landlords’ apportionment of service charges was permitted under their leases.
Each lease provided that the leaseholder was to pay a service charge made up of a share of three types of cost of maintaining the building and wider estate- insurance, building services and estate services.
La quota di partecipazione degli affittuari a ciascun tipo di costi è stata fissata in una percentuale fissa, oppure “such part as the Landlord may otherwise reasonable determine.”
Over the years, the Landlord had demanded service charge which differed from the set percentage referred in each individual lease. The landlord argued that the abovementioned provision, allowed it to vary the set apportionment.
I locatari sostenevano che le disposizioni della sezione 27A(6) del Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (‘LTA 1985’) significavano che la disposizione che permetteva al locatore di variare il tasso stabilito era nulla.
Section 27A(6) of the LTA 1985 provides that “an agreement by the tenant of a dwelling (other than a post-dispute arbitrato agreement) is void in so far as it purports to provide for a determination- (a) in a particular manner or (b) on particular evidence, of any question which may be the subject of an application under subsection (1) or (3).
Le disposizioni di cui ai commi (1) e (3) dell'articolo 27A si riferiscono alle domande che possono essere presentate dai locatari al tribunale per stabilire se gli oneri di servizio o i costi per i servizi, le riparazioni, la manutenzione, i miglioramenti, l'assicurazione o la gestione sono dovuti e, in caso affermativo, (a) la persona da cui sarebbero dovuti (b) la persona a cui sarebbero dovuti (c) l'importo che sarebbe dovuto (d) la data in cui sono dovuti o entro la quale sono dovuti e (e) il modo in cui sarebbero dovuti.
Il First Tier Tribunal ha deciso che la deroga del locatore ai tassi stabiliti era ragionevole e doveva essere applicata. L'Upper Tribunal ha ribaltato questa decisione e ha ritenuto che l'articolo 27A(6) funzionasse in modo da rendere nulla la disposizione in questione, a meno che i locatari non accettassero di discostarsi dai tassi stabiliti nei loro contratti di locazione.
The Court of Appello allowed the landlord’s appeal and stated that the effect of Section 27A(6) was to transfer the power to vary the set rates from the landlord to the First Tier Tribunal. The Leaseholders appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
La Corte Suprema ha stabilito che la sezione 27A(6) non era stata concepita per “privare questa forma di decisione manageriale da parte dei proprietari”.” (i.e. to prevent the landlord from relying on that clause in the lease if it was determined that certain steps were required to be taken in respect of the Proprietà which would require certain leaseholders to pay a larger percentage towards such costs).
The Supreme Court determined that it would still be open to the leaseholders to challenge whether the rates decided by the landlord, or the costs incurred themselves were reasonable, but not whether the clause itself was reasonable or whether the Landlord was entitled to rely on it as it had done in this case. As the First Tier Tribunal had determined that the rates applied and the costs incurred were both deemed to be reasonable, the Supreme Court restored the First Tier Tribunal’s decision and reasoning.
Questo caso fornisce importanti chiarimenti ai locatori e agli agenti di gestione di contratti di locazione di lunga durata che hanno disposizioni simili nei loro contratti di locazione.
Rakusen -v- Jepsen e altri [2023] UKSC 9
This case volontà be of relevance for landlords and managing agents involved with short leases, in particular those who are operating Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs) and those with rent-to-rent agreements, intermediate landlords and managing agents.
The Respondent in this case, Mr Rakusen was the leaseholder of a flat on Finchley Road in North London who granted a tenancy to Kensington Property Investment Group Limited. Kensington then entered into agreements with various tenants granting them each possession of one room in the flat.
A novembre 2018, l'appartamento era un HMO e doveva essere autorizzato, anche se in realtà non è mai stato autorizzato come HMO.
In September 2019, the tenants of the HMO applied to the First Tier Tribunal for a Rent Repayment Order against Mr Rakusen on the basis that the Property was being run as an unlicensed HMO (section 41 of the Housing e Planning Act 2016). Mr Rakusen denied that he committed an offence and made a strike out application on the basis that a Rent Repayment Order can only be made against the immediate landlord of the applicant.
The First Tier Tribunal did not strike out the application, and held that Mr Rakusen was ‘a’ landlord, albeit not ‘the’ landlord of the tenants. On appeal the Upper Tribunal, held that a Rent Repayment Order can be made against a superior landlord of a tenant but granted permission for Mr Rakusen to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Diversamente dal Tribunale, la Corte d'appello ha accolto l'appello del sig. Rakusen e ha ritenuto che un ordine di rimborso dell'affitto non potesse essere emesso nei confronti di un locatore superiore. Gli inquilini hanno fatto ricorso alla Corte Suprema.
La disposizione chiave oggetto del ricorso era la sezione 40(1) e (2) dell'Housing and Planning Act 2016. Queste sezioni prevedono: (1) This Chapter confers power on the First Tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to- (a) repay an amount of rent paid by the tenant, or (b) pay a local housing authority an amount in respect of a relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy.”
La Corte Suprema ha deciso che non solo l'articolo 40 deve essere interpretato in modo semplice - in modo da applicarsi solo al locatore del particolare contratto di locazione - ma che decidere che gli ordini di rimborso dell'affitto sono disponibili contro i locatori superiori potrebbe comportare difficoltà pratiche in caso di una lunga catena di vari contratti di locazione a soggetti diversi.
Further, the Supreme Court found that where there are numerous other sanctions available against rogue landlords and the risk that rogue landlords may attempt to circumvent prosecution by setting out large chains of tenancies / setting up shell companies to function as intermediate landlords was less than the problem which would develop if they departed from the clear definition of a Rent Repayment Order as set out in section 40(2) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.
Landlords and managing agents who engage in rent-to-rent agreements should therefore ensure that HMO licensing rules are followed.
Ulteriori informazioni
- Notizie Autore:Marissa Lawrence
Marissa Lawrence
Avvocato Associato Senior
