In landlord and tenant law, few words have carried as much practical weight as “begun”. The Housing Acts of 1985 and 1988 require possession proceedings to be “begun” within strict statutory periods following the service of a notice. For decades, the conventional understanding was clear: proceedings are “begun” when the court issues the claim form, as set out in the Civil Procedure Rules and confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Salford City Council v Garner.
That certainty was shaken in Brent London Borough Council v Hajan. The Court of Appeal held that proceedings could also be treated as “begun” when a landlord amends an existing claim, provided the amendment follows the statutory timeframe in a later notice.
A year on, Hajan continues to influence possession practice, and its ramifications are still unfolding, highlighting the need for solid legal advice
The Statutory Framework: Why Timing Matters
The main statutory routes to possession impose strict deadlines:
- Section 21 (4D), Housing Act 1988: proceedings must be begun within six months of service of the notice (or within four months of the date specified in the notice, if later).
- Section 8(3), Housing Act 1988: proceedings must be begun within twelve months of the notice being served.
- Section 83A(2), Housing Act 1985: proceedings must be begun after the date specified in the notice and while the notice is still in force (normally 12 months).
The CPR also provides:
- CPR 7.2(1): proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the claimant.
- CPR PD 7A para 6.1: distinguishes between proceedings being “brought” and “begun”.
Traditionally, this meant that if the court had not issued a claim within the statutory window, the proceedings were out of time and vulnerable to dismissal. This interpretation caused particular problems under section 21, where in practice landlords had only four months after expiry of the notice to ensure issue, potentially leading to the need for an eviction warrant
The Facts in Brent LBC v Hajan
- On 30 November 2022, Brent served a notice seeking possession under section 83 Housing Act 1985, citing anti-social behaviour grounds (grounds 1 and 2, Schedule 2).
- On 21 December 2022, the council issued possession proceedings pursuant to that notice.
- On 4 May 2023, following the tenant’s conviction for a serious offence, Brent served a further notice under Section 83ZA (the mandatory “absolute” ground introduced by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014).
- On 6 June 2023, the council applied to amend its particulars of claim in the existing proceeding to rely on the mandatory ground. The amendment was granted by a Deputy District Judge on 5 July 2023.
- The tenant appealed, arguing that the proceedings had not been “begun” after the date in the section 83ZA notice and were therefore defective.
The Court of Appeal’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeal dismissed the tenant’s appeal. Its reasoning can be summarised as follows:
- Literal rule insufficient: While CPR 7.2 provides that proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form, this cannot be applied straightforwardly to amended proceedings. To do so would produce wasteful duplication.
- Purposive interpretation: The statutory scheme’s substantive protections, requiring a time gap between notice and possession proceedings, and affording tenants the opportunity for review, had been observed. It would undermine the scheme’s purpose if landlords were forced to abandon live proceedings and re-issue.
- Proceedings “begun” by amendment: Where the court permits an amendment and specifies an effective date, the proceedings can be regarded as “begun” on that date for the purposes of the statutory time limits.
The Court memorably cautioned that “the procedural tail should not be allowed to wag the substantive dog”.
How Does This Sit With Garner?
In Salford CC v Garner, the Court of Appeal had appeared to settle the meaning of “begun” as aligned with CPR 7.2, i.e., issue of the claim form. Interestingly, Hajan did not expressly consider Garner. Instead, it sidestepped by holding that CPR 7.2 “cannot be applied” in cases of amendment.
The result is an uneasy tension: on one view, Garner remains good law, but only for newly issued claims. Hajan effectively carves out a separate category where amendments can themselves mark the moment proceedings are “begun”.
Practical Implications (One Year On)
For Landlords
- Hajan offers a potential lifeline where notices post-date the commencement of proceedings. Instead of having to start again, landlords may be able to amend and keep the claim alive.
- Particularly helpful where delays in issue were due to court backlogs rather than the landlord’s own actions.
- However, permission to amend is discretionary. Landlords cannot assume amendments will always be granted, especially if statutory conditions (e.g. time limited triggers under s.83ZA) have already expired.
For Tenants
- The judgment may be seen as diluting the strict protection of statutory time limits.
- A tenant may now face amended proceedings even if the original claim was arguably “out of time”.
- On the other hand, the substantive protections, such as notice period and review rights, remain intact.
For Practitioners
- Expect more applications to amend claims in possession proceedings, particularly where landlords have served subsequent notices.
- Courts may show increased willingness to allow amendment where this avoids duplication of costs and effort.
- Nonetheless, practitioners should continue to advise landlords to issue in good time to avoid relying on the discretion of the court.
Could “Dead” Claims be Revived?
One of the most debated aspects of Hajan is whether proceedings that were “dead” from the outset, because the original claim was issued outside the statutory timeframe, could be “revived” by amendment, potentially impacting the issuance of a suspended possession order
While the Court did not expressly decide this point, its reasoning suggests that in some cases, amendment could breathe life into otherwise defective claims. This is particularly significant for section 21 and section 8 claims where timing has historically been tight, especially in cases involving rent arrears
The Position in 2025
A year later, Hajan has begun to filter into practice, particularly affecting private landlords:
- County courts are increasingly encountering amendment applications citing Hajan.
- There is anecdotal evidence of fewer outright dismissals for being “out of time”, and more case management decisions focusing on whether amendment is appropriate.
- The case has not yet been tested in the Supreme Court, and its interaction with Garner remains unresolved.
Looking Ahead
- Potential expansion: while Hajan arose under section 83ZA, its reasoning may extend to section 8 and section 21 claims. This could represent a broader softening of statutory time limits.
- Uncertainty remains: until a higher court revisits the issue, practitioners must navigate the tension between Garner and Hajan.
- Policy implications: the judgment reflects a judicial willingness to prioritise efficiency over strict procedural rules. Whether this strikes the right balance between landlord flexibility and tenant protection will likely remain contested.
Conclusion
Brent LBC v Hajan has redrawn the map of possession proceedings. By holding that amended claims can be treated as “begun”, the Court of Appeal has introduced both flexibility and uncertainty into an area once thought settled, which may affect the interpretation of tenancy agreements
For landlords, the decision provides a valuable tool to avoid wasted costs. For tenants, it represents a loosening of strict statutory safeguards. For the courts, it reflects a pragmatic approach in an era of stretched resources.
One year on, Hajan remains a case to watch. Its full implications will only become clear as courts apply it across the spectrum of possession claims.
Landlord and Tenant Matters: Contact Us
Ben Lewis is an associate solicitor in RFB’s litigation department. For inquiries on this topic, please contact Ben Lewis via email at B.Lewis@rfblegal.co.uk or by phone on 0203 947 8892.
Ben Lewis
Associate Solicitor
